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This study aims to investigate the practice of income smoothing through loan loss 
provisions in European banks, providing new insights on the difference of discretionary 
behaviours between state and non-state-owned banks. The sample comprises 248 
commercial banks, of which 35 are state-owned and 213 are non-state-owned, from 15 
European countries and is drawn from the 2011 to 2018 period. Following a modified 
version of the model used by Ahmed et al. (1999), Anandarajan et al. (2007), Leventis et 
al. (2011), Bouvatier et al. (2014), Curcio and Hasan (2015) and Ozili and Arun (2018), 
the results show that state-owned banks engage in a lower degree of earnings smoothing 
when compared to their non-state counterparts, entailing that government protection is an 
important factor in mitigating earnings smoothing practices. Finally, the findings do not 
provide clear evidence for a relation between elections years and income smoothing, 
suggesting that European banks do not face political pressure for earnings management 
in the period of analysis. 
 
KEYWORDS: Earnings management, income smoothing, loan loss provisions, state-
















O presente estudo tem como objetivo investigar a prática de alisamento de resultados 
através de provisões para perdas com empréstimos nas instituições bancárias europeias, 
contribuindo com uma nova perspetiva sobre a diferença de comportamentos 
discricionários entre Bancos estatais e não estatais. A amostra é composta por 248 Bancos 
comerciais, dos quais 35 são estatais e 213 são não estatais, provenientes de 15 países 
europeus, e é relativa ao período compreendido entre 2011 e 2018. De acordo com uma 
versão modificada do modelo utilizado por Ahmed et al. (1999), Anandarajan et al. 
(2007), Leventis et al. (2011), Bouvatier et al. (2014), Curcio e Hasan (2015) e Ozili e 
Arun (2018), os resultados demonstram que os Bancos estatais se envolvem num menor 
grau de alisamento de resultados quando comparados com os seus homólogos não 
estatais, sugerindo que a proteção estatal é um importante fator mitigador de práticas de 
alisamento de resultados. Por último, os resultados não fornecem evidências claras de 
uma relação entre anos eleitorais e alisamento de resultados, sugerindo que os Bancos 
europeus não enfrentam pressão política para gerir resultados no período analisado. 
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The role of financial reporting and standards setting is to provide information about a 
firm’s performance to stakeholders, implying that accounting standards are only valuable 
if they enable financial statements to effectively represent the firm’s economic position 
and performance (Healy and Wahlen, 1999). However, prior research has recognized that 
companies use flexibility in accounting standards to manage their reported earnings. In 
fact, Bushman (2014) adds that accounting rules define the boundaries within which 
accounting discretion occurs. 
The banking industry has been a primary focus of numerous academic research 
mainly driven by the specificities of this industry such as the bank’s dominant accrual: 
loan loss provisions (LLPs); the preponderance of financial assets and liabilities and the 
importance of financial reporting in regulation (Beatty and Liao, 2014). In this context, 
prior literature provides insights about three main objectives pursued by bank managers 
through LLPs: capital management to avoid the costs associated with the violation of 
capital requirements; earnings management with the purpose to stabilize the bank net 
profit over time; and signalling future earnings (Curcio and Hasan, 2015; Anandarajan, 
Hasan and Lozano-Vivas, 2003; Ahmed, Takeda and Thomas, 1999; Anandarajan, Hasan 
and McCarthy, 2007; Azzali, Fornaciari and Mazza, 2014). 
The study of earnings management in the banking industry is particularly relevant 
given the importance of banks in the allocation of capital (Bushman, 2014), their inherent 
lack of transparency (Beatty and Liao, 2014; Bushman, 2014) and ultimately the central 
role they play for financial stability (Bushman, 2014; Ozili and Outa, 2017). 
Earnings management can be described as the management of reported earnings in 
such a way that the end-of-year financial statements do not represent the accurate 
economic result of a bank’s activity (Curcio and Hasan, 2015). Income smoothing is a 
specific kind of earnings management that aims to stabilize the net profit over time, 
reducing its variability through the discretionary use of LLPs (Curcio and Hasan, 2015). 
This specific practice will be the focus of this study. 
The majority of existing literature suggests that bank managers use LLPs in order to 
manage earnings (Anandarajan et al., 2003; Ahmed et al., 1999; Collins, Shackelford and 
Wahlen, 1995; Beatty and Liao, 2014; among others). In theory, the purpose of LLPs is 
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to reflect expected future losses on bank loan portfolios (Ahmed et al., 1999; Anandarajan 
et al., 2003; Anandarajan et al., 2007). However, since future losses cannot be accurately 
estimated, there is margin for discretion when bank managers set aside this provision 
(Anandarajan et al., 2003). 
Although the large majority of the banking literature provides significant evidence on 
the use of LLPs as a tool to manage income, the contributes of prior research are mixed: 
while Ma (1988), Wahlen (1994), Collins et al. (1995), among others, find evidence to 
support the idea that banks use LLPs to manage income, Moyer (1990), Beatty, 
Chamberlain and Magliolo (1995), and Ahmed et al. (1999) do not find support for this 
behaviour.  
Furthermore, ownership structure is widely accepted in the literature as a determining 
factor of firm performance (Cornett, Guo, Khaksari and Tehranian, 2010). By analysing 
firms in 45 different countries, Ben-Nasr, Boubakri and Cosset (2015) provide evidence 
that state ownership is associated with lower earnings quality and more specifically, more 
earnings management.  
Previous authors such as Barth, Caprio and Levine (2001) and La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes and Shleifer (2002) find that state ownership of banks has major impact in 
financial development. The study of state ownership in the banking industry is 
particularly relevant given the importance of this sector to the economy, as it has been 
demonstrated by the recent financial crisis (Bushman, 2014). 
Therefore, an important dimension to further investigate is the impact of state versus 
non-state ownership on earnings management practices in the banking sector. Taking this 
into account, the main motivation of this study is to determine whether there is a greater 
extent of income smoothing behaviour in state-owned banks (SOB) relative to non-state-
owned banks (non-SOB). Additionally, the study analyses the effect of political 
influences in the banking industry using as a proxy the national election years of each 
European country. 
To accomplish the research objectives, we analyse a sample of 248 European 
commercial banks, of which 35 are state-owned and 213 are non-state-owned, for the 
years 2011 to 2018. We follow Ahmed et al. (1999), Anandarajan et al. (2007), Leventis, 
Dimitropoulos and Anandarajan (2011), Bouvatier, Lepetit and Strobel (2014), Curcio 
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and Hasan (2015) and Ozili and Arun (2018) and employ a modified version of their 
model in order to investigate the presence of income smoothing through LLPs. 
The results do not provide conclusive evidence to support the use of LLPs to smooth 
income by European commercial banks. Nevertheless, the findings indicate a significant 
decline in earnings smoothing behaviour by SOB when compared to their non-state 
counterparts, suggesting that government protection constrains earnings smoothing 
practices. Moreover, the results show that the level of earnings smoothing decreases in 
the severely affected countries of the 2008 financial crisis, indicating that high monitoring 
from different stakeholders in periods of crisis enhances the quality of financial reporting 
(Azzali et al., 2014; Filip and Raffournier, 2014). Finally, we do not find clear evidence 
to support the relationship between election years and income smoothing in SOB and 
also, in a more general setting, in all our sample banks, which suggests that the banking 
industry in Europe is not subject to political pressure to manage earnings during the 
electoral cycle. 
This study contributes to the research on earnings management in the banking sector 
in several ways. First, we provide updated evidence on the use of LLPs as a tool for 
income smoothing by using a recent period of analysis between 2011 and 2018. Second, 
by comparing the behaviour of state and non-SOB, we contribute to a better 
understanding of the influence of state ownership on income smoothing practices in the 
European banking industry. Third, the inconclusive findings for the role of state 
ownership in earnings management in non-financial companies and the lack of evidence 
in the existing banking literature makes this an interesting topic to further research. 
Finally, it is important for bank regulators and supervisors to understand if and how 
mechanisms such as LLPs are used as a tool to smooth earnings and to misrepresent 
financial reports in the banking industry. 
The remainder of the study is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides a literature 
review, followed by the hypothesis development in Chapter 3. Next, in Section 4 we 
describe the data, the sample selection process and explain the model we adopt in our 
analysis. Chapter 5 presents the results of the statistical analysis and Chapter 6 provides 
the additional analysis and robustness tests. Finally, in Chapter 7 we discuss the results 
and present the conclusions of the study. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1. Earnings management in the banking industry 
Healy and Wahlen (1999) define earnings management as the incorporation in 
financial reporting of the manager’s judgement and the consequent alteration of a 
company’s reported economic performance to mislead some stakeholders or even to 
influence contractual outcomes.  
Income smoothing is a specific kind of earnings management with the purpose to 
stabilize banks’ net profit over time, using LLPs as a discretionary tool. Bank managers 
will increase the amount of LLPs when earnings before taxes and LLPs are high and will 
decrease the amount of this accrual when earnings are low (Curcio and Hasan, 2015). Ma 
(1988) argue that earnings smoothing is the deliberated reduction of earnings variations 
regarding some normal level. According to Anandarajan et al. (2007), managers have 
incentives to smooth earnings because reduced volatility is generally assumed as a signal 
of lower risk. 
The banking industry has been a primary focus of numerous academic research for 
several reasons: the importance of banks' balance sheets, the exposure of economies to 
the banking sector’ systemic risk, the complexities of its governance and regulation 
(Bushman, 2014), the preponderance of financial assets and liabilities, the importance of 
financial reporting in regulation and the bank’s dominant accrual: LLPs (Beatty and Liao, 
2014). 
The primary activity of a financial institution such as banks consist in collecting 
deposits or savings and issuing loans, either to individuals, firms or governments, in order 
to finance consumption, investment and capital expenditure, therefore contributing to 
economic growth (Ozili and Outa, 2017). However, a bank’s lending activities might lead 
to credit risk if borrowers are unable to repay their debts. To mitigate this risk, bank 
managers set aside LLPs as a management tool for expected future losses on loans (Ozili 
and Outa, 2017). 
In fact, LLPs are accruals for expected future losses on a bank loan portfolio (Collins 
et al., 1995). Thus, they are set aside to face a possible future deterioration of the quality 
in a banks’ credit portfolio (Curcio and Hasan, 2015). 
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However, the assessment of expected loan losses may involve a significant element 
of subjectivity and judgement that allows banks a certain degree of latitude in managing 
earnings (Bouvatier et al., 2014). Therefore, banks may have the ability to engage in 
income smoothing by increasing LLPs when income is high, and understating this accrual 
when income is low (Bouvatier et al., 2014). Federal banks and regulators recognize that 
these provisions cannot precisely match actual losses and might include a margin for 
imprecision that has been exploited by banks (Anandarajan et al., 2007). 
The study of a specific accrual in the banking literature contrasts with the literature 
reviewing non-financial firms, which has the tendency to study overall earnings or total 
accruals (Beatty and Liao, 2014). Beatty and Liao (2014) argue that the focus on LLPs in 
the banking literature is enlightened by (i) the predominance of this accrual for banks, 
explaining a great part of the variability in bank’s total accruals, (ii) its impact to bank 
performance, (iii) the importance of estimated losses in evaluating opaque assets such as 
bank loans and (iii) the effect of this provision on regulatory capital ratios. 
The banking research suggest that smoothing can mitigate pro-cyclical behaviour by 
allowing an increase in reserves in good times in order to decrease the amount of profits, 
and a reserve draw down in bad times (when the economy slows down and potential 
defaults become real) by reversing the discretionary items in order to increase the amount 
of profit that would otherwise have been reported (Bushman, 2014; Curcio and Hasan, 
2015). However, discretionary provision practices with the aim of smoothing earnings 
may obscure the real risk of a bank's loan portfolio (Bushman, 2014). 
This view is consistent with the regulators interest in reducing bank pro-cyclical 
behaviour: banks are required to set LLPs aside against expected credit losses but they 
also have to raise an adequate amount of capital to face unexpected credit losses. 
Consequently, earnings management practices might also be the result of a bank 
manager’s attempt to meet capital requirements (Curcio and Hasan, 2015). 
Prior studies indicate that managers use LLPs in the banking industry as a 
management tool extensively used for the purposes of: capital management to avoid costs 
associated with the violation of capital requirements; earnings management, aiming at 
stabilizing the bank net profit over time; and, finally, as a signal to investors about future 
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earnings (Curcio and Hasan, 2015; Anandarajan et al., 2003; Ahmed et al., 1999; 
Anandarajan et al., 2007; Azzali et al., 2014). 
In this context, there has been conducted considerable work mainly in the United 
States (U.S.), focusing on the relation between LLPs and earnings management 
(Greenawalt and Sinkey, 1988; Ma, 1988; Beatty et al., 1995; Ahmed et al., 1999; among 
others), LLPs and capital management (Beatty et al., 1995; Collins et al., 1995; Moyer, 
1990; among others) and the use of LLPs as a tool for signalling future intentions to 
outsiders (Liu and Ryan, 1995; Wahlen, 1994; among others). 
The focus of our work is the investigation on earnings management practices and 
more precisely the income smoothing behaviour. Existing research conducted mostly in 
the U.S. provides mixed evidence on the use of LLP to manage earnings. While Ma 
(1988), Greenawalt and Sinkey (1988), Wahlen (1994), Collins et al. (1995), among 
others, find evidence to support the practice of earnings management through LLPs, 
Moyer (1990), Beatty et al. (1995), and Ahmed et al. (1999) do not find evidence to 
support for this behaviour. 
Ma (1988) provides evidence that U.S. commercial banks smooth reported earnings 
by using LLPs, but found no relation between the quality of a bank’s loan portfolio and 
LLPs. Greenawalt and Sinkey (1988) find that regional banks engage in income 
smoothing to a greater extent than money-centred banks. Collins et al. (1995) also find 
strong evidence for a positive relation between earnings and LLPs, supporting the idea 
that banks use LLPs to manage earnings. The authors find that profitable banks decrease 
LLPs when their earnings are relatively low and increase this provision when earnings 
are relatively high, consistent with the income smoothing theory.  
On the other side, Ahmed et al. (1999) find no significant relation between earnings 
(before taxes and LLPs) and LLPs and attribute this difference of results to the different 
model used, when comparing to Collins et al. (1995). 
There is also a large body of literature examining the use of LLPs in European banks. 
Using a sample of listed European banks that adopt IFRS standards, Leventis et al. (2011) 
provide evidence for earnings management practices using LLPs, although this behaviour 
is significantly reduced after the implementation of IFRS standards. Curcio and Hasan 
(2015) examine the case of Euro and non-Euro Area during the 1996-2006 period, and 
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conclude that earnings management is strongly supported for banks in the Eurozone but 
not for non-Eurozone banks.  
Bouvatier et al. (2014) find that European commercial banks with more concentrated 
ownership use LLPs to smooth reported earnings. The authors suggest that earnings 
management practices are less pronounced in countries with stronger supervisory regimes 
or higher external audit quality. Bonin and Kosak (2013) investigate the pro-cyclical 
behaviour of LLPs and find evidence that banks in the emerging European region use 
LLPs to smooth reported earnings. 
As to Australian banks, Anandarajan et al. (2007) show that they use LLPs to engage 
in earnings management, indicating that reported earnings might not reflect the true 
economic reality of Australian financial institutions. Furthermore, the authors find that 
listed commercial banks engage in earnings management to a greater extent relative to 
non-listed banks. 
Studying banks around the world, Fonseca and González (2008) find that the national 
characteristics of regulation and supervision in banking is the most relevant factor to 
explain the differences across countries in bank income smoothing. The authors suggest 
that income smoothing decreases with investor protection, the extent of accounting 
disclosure, restrictions on bank activities and official and private supervision, while it 
increases with market-orientation and development of the financial system. 
Overall, the majority of existing studies on this topic provide evidence to support the 
existence of earnings management practices in the banking industry worldwide. 
2.2. The incentives of earnings management practices 
Shen et al. (2005) argue that there are three main reasons explaining why the banking 
industry have different incentives to manage earnings, comparative to the general 
industry. First, a bank’s balance sheet reflects significantly higher leverage, facing a 
potential problem of lack of liquidity and being exposed to the risk of bank runs. Thus, 
banks have a strong incentive to present positive earnings in order to keep the depositors’ 
confidence. Second, the specific characteristic of their asset portfolio, which is inherently 
more opaque, present managers with ample opportunities for risk management. Lastly, 
banks are heavily regulated such as through capital adequacy ratios, liquidity ratios, 
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among others. Therefore, banks might engage in earnings management to avoid violating 
regulations. 
Furthermore, previous empirical research suggest management compensation and 
debt contracts as being incentives for managers to engage in earnings management 
(Moyer, 1990; Healy and Wahlen, 1999). Studying publicly traded bank holding 
companies in U.S., Cornett, McNutt and Tehranian (2009) find evidence of earnings 
smoothing, suggesting that CEO pay-for performance is positively related to earnings 
management, while more independent boards appear to limit this practice. 
Cimini (2015) adds that another incentive for managers to behave opportunistically is 
the presence of asymmetric information and conflicting interests between insiders and 
outsiders, using financial information to misrepresent the performance of the firm through 
the practice of earnings management. Kanagaretnam, Lobo and Mathieu (2004) argue 
that the motivation of bank managers to smooth earnings through LLPs is affected by 
bank-specific factors such as incentives to reduce the cost of external borrowing. The 
authors argue that well-capitalized banks have less regulatory supervision, which allow 
them more margin to smooth earnings when compared to less well-capitalized banks.  
On the other hand, prior studies provide evidence that stronger regulatory quality 
constrains the incentives to manage income. Bouvatier et al. (2014) find that in countries 
with stronger supervisory regimes, banks reduce their income smoothing behaviour. 
Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki (2003) argue that earnings management decrease with investor 
protection and suggest a direct relation between corporate governance and the quality of 
earnings reported. Ozili and Arun (2018) claim that reduced income smoothing can reflect 
higher transparency in financial reporting and Burgstahler, Hail and Leuz (2006) confirms 
the central role of enforcement mechanism by showing that earnings management are 
more pronounced in countries with weaker legal systems and enforcement. Finally, there 
are also recent research suggesting that an increase in monitoring can lead to a decrease 
in earnings management practices (Azzali et al., 2014; Filip and Raffournier, 2014). 
2.3. The influence of state ownership in the banking industry 
An increasing number of studies suggest that a better developed financial system 
enhances economic growth on the long run by allocating capital to more productive 
investments (Barth et al., 2001; Levine, 2005). If we look at the primary functions of a 
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country’s financial system, they include production of information about allocation of 
capital and investment opportunities; monitor investments; facilitate the trading; 
mobilizing and assembling savings; among others (Bushman, 2014; Levine, 2005). Each 
of these financial functions may influence savings and investment decisions and therefore 
hence economic growth (Levine, 2005), confirming the crucial role that banks play in the 
development of an economy (Yang and Lee, 2018). 
Taking into account the importance of the banking system in the economy, an 
important subject to investigate is the influence of their ownership structure. When banks 
are directly controlled by the government, the state’s role in finance is much wider than 
just regulation and enforcement functions. Therefore, it is important to take the state’s 
control of financial resources in consideration whenever investigating a financial system 
in countries that have SOB (Dinç, 2005). 
Two competing theories have been developed in the literature to explain the economic 
role of SOB. First, the social view suggests that state-owned companies are created to 
address market failures in financial and credit markets (Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1986) and 
that SOB contribute to economic development and to the improvement of general welfare. 
Under this theory,  the objective of SOB is to improve welfare, so they should finance 
socially important projects (Sapienza, 2004; Ashraf, Arshad and Yan, 2018), even if 
doing so does not maximize profits (Chen, Chen, Lin and Sharma, 2016). Thus, state 
ownership of banks should benefit subsequent financial and economic development, and 
specifically productivity growth (La Porta et al., 2002). 
On the other side, the political view suggests that state-owned enterprises are created 
to maximize politicians’ personal objectives such as maximizing employment or finance 
political connected companies (Sapienza, 2004). Also, SOB face political pressure in that 
politicians use them for political purposes, such as obtaining and maintaining political 
support (Ashraf et al., 2018). Therefore, according to the political view, state ownership 
enables the government to finance the inefficient but politically desirable projects, which 
are detrimental to productivity growth (La Porta et al., 2002). 
Previous studies suggest that state ownership of banks is correlated with poor 
financial development. Barth et al. (2001) provide empirical evidence that government 
ownership of banks is associated with a lower level of financial development and La Porta 
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et al. (2002) document that government ownership of banks is associated with slower 
subsequent financial development and with lower subsequent economic growth. 
There are also several researches suggesting that state ownership usually leads to 
underperformance of SOB. Banerjee and Velamuri (2015) provide evidence that SOB 
underperform when compared to non-SOB due to social outreach commitments. Cornett 
et al. (2010) find that SOB present an inferior performance than their non-state 
counterparts prior to 2001 and state that the performance differences are more significant 
in countries where the government is heavily involved in the banking system. Micco, 
Panizza and Yanez (2007) document that SOB operating in developing countries are less 
profitable than non-SOB but find no strong correlation between ownership and 
performance for banks located in developed countries. 
As described, existing banking literature focus mostly on the relationship between 
ownership structure and banks’ profitability. There are some studies concerning the 
influence of state ownership in earnings management practices but they are related to 
non-financial firms (Ding, Zhang and Zhang, 2007; Wang and Yung, 2011; Chen, Chen, 
Lobo and Wang, 2011; Ben-Nasr et al., 2015). Therefore, the lack of evidence for the role 
of state ownership in earnings management in the banking industry warrant further 
research on this topic. 
2.4. The influence of political connections in the banking industry 
Because SOB play an important role in the financial system and in the process of 
economic development (La Porta et al., 2002), the degree of political influence on the 
banks’ performance is important from both a policy and a regulatory perspective. 
  Previous literature has investigated the possibility that the actions of SOB are 
motivated by political concerns. Politicians have objectives that are often influenced by 
political interests but in conflict with social welfare improvements and firm value 
maximization (Cornet et al., 2010), suggesting that the performance of SOB is inferior to 
that of non-SOB predominantly because of the contradictory incentives of bank managers 
and political officers (Cornett et al., 2010). Sapienza (2004) find that SOB charge lower 
interest rates for firms affiliated with the ruling party than for firms without such an 
affiliation, suggesting that these banks serve as a mechanism to supply political support.  
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In this sense, the election years have been widespread in the banking literature as an 
indicator for political influence on SOB. The empirical results in Dinç (2005) indicate 
that SOB increase their lending in election years when compared to non-SOB in major 
emerging markets in the 1990s and that these actions are influenced by political 
motivations. However, the authors are not able to find a similar election-year increase in 
developed economies. Ashraf et al. (2018) found that SOB in developing countries over 
the period 1998-2012 face significant political pressure: their loan growth is significantly 
higher and the net interest income is significantly lower in election years. 
Jackowicz, Kowalewski and Kozłowski (2013) examine the behaviour of 11 Central 
European countries over the period 1995–2008 and found only partial support for political 
pressure on SOB. Specifically, they concluded that SOB have significantly lower net 
interest income ratios during the years of parliamentary elections. 
 
 




3. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
3.1. Income smoothing 
As stated, the banking literature has shown that one of the main accrual expenses for 
the banking sector are LLPs and that they are used as a tool for earnings management. In 
order to smooth earnings through LLPs, bank managers will induce a positive relation 
between LLPs and earnings (before taxes and LLPs), meaning that they will increase 
LLPs when earnings are high and deliberately understate it when earnings are low (Curcio 
and Hasan, 2015).  
Following prior studies (Ahmed et al.,1999; Anandarajan et al., 2007 and Leventis et 
al., 2011), our paper focuses on income smoothing, a specific kind of earnings 
management that aims to reduce income volatility by stabilizing banks’ net profit over 
time using LLPs as a discretionary management tool (Curcio and Hasan, 2015).  
The initial findings of Ma (1988) and Greenawalt and Sinkey (1988), supported by 
the large majority of previous research about this subject, provide evidence that banks use 
LLPs to smooth reported earnings. 
Collins et al. (1995) find a positive relation between LLPs and earnings management. 
Anandarajan et al. (2007) found evidence that banks in Australia use LLPs to manage 
earnings. Leventis et al. (2011) also show that banks manipulate earnings through LLPs, 
despite the significantly decrease of this opportunistic behaviour after the implementation 
of IFRS. Fonseca and González (2008) find that income smoothing increases in the 
presence of more developed and market-oriented financial systems. Finally, Curcio and 
Hasan (2015) argue that banks in the Eurozone use LLPs to smooth earnings in a more 
aggressive way when compared to banks not in the Eurozone. 
Therefore, we investigate the relation between LLPs and earnings before taxes and 
provisions and state our first hypothesis as follow: 
H1: Bank managers use LLPs to smooth earnings. 
3.2. State ownership and income smoothing 
Previous literature suggests that the type of corporate ownership affects corporate 
decisions. This can be explained by the agency theory, which indicates that managers 
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acting as agents for owners reveal tendencies to pursue strategies that meet their own 
goals, rather than those of the owners (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). According to Becht, 
Bolton and Röell (2011), the traditional conflicts between shareholders, managers, and 
boards are also present in banks.  
Cornett et al. (2010) confirm the role of ownership structure as an instrumental 
determinant of firm performance. An important dimension of the ownership structure, in 
addition to insider versus outsider stock ownership, is state versus non-state ownership 
structure (Cornett et al., 2010). The state’s role in finance becomes broader and beyond 
the regular functions of regulation and enforcement when the bank assets are directly 
controlled by the state (Dinç, 2005). 
Because SOB play an important role in the process of economic development (La 
Porta et al., 2002) and have impact in financial systems (Dinç, 2005), the extent of 
political influence on the banks’ performance is of great importance from both a policy 
and a regulatory perspective. Besides the possible influence of state ownership in banks’ 
performance, it is also interesting to investigate their influence on earnings management 
practices such as income smoothing through LLPs. 
Empirical evidence on the relation between state ownership and earnings management 
is still limited and provides mixed results. The majority of existing studies focus on 
Chinese firms, reflecting the specific nature of this market where the government plays a 
key role in the economy. Thus, an important dimension to further investigate is the role 
of state ownership in the banking industry and more specially, in developed economies 
such as European countries.  
Ben-Nasr et al. (2015) study a sample composed by non-financial firms from 45 
countries and demonstrate that state ownership affects negatively the quality of reported 
earnings, highlighting that state ownership is associated with more earnings management.  
Contrarily, Wang and Yung (2011) find lower levels of earnings management among 
state-owned firms than non-state-owned companies, suggesting that government 
protection might have been an important factor in mitigating the pressure on managers to 
manage firm-specific information. Studying Chinese listed companies, Ding et al. (2007) 
suggest that state-owned firms demonstrate a lower degree of earnings management than 
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non-state-owned firms. Accordingly, Chen et al. (2011) argue that managers of state-
owned enterprises have weaker incentives to manage earnings. 
As to European firms, Gaio and Pinto (2018) document that state-owned firms engage 
in earnings management in a lower degree than their non-state-owned counterparts. The 
authors reinforce the idea that government protection reduces incentives to manage 
earnings.  
Laeven (2013) claims that governance in the banking industry is different from that 
of non-financial companies mainly because of the existence of deposit insurance, implicit 
state guarantees and prudential regulation. Because governments usually implicitly 
guarantee banks’ liabilities, SOB do not face serious liquidity problems and stringent 
leverage constraints as non-SOB do in periods of crisis (Chen et al., 2016). 
Thus, we anticipate that SOB may have stronger incentives to improve their 
accounting practices and consequently mitigate earnings management practices. We 
therefore hypothesize that government protection over SOB strengthens the negative 
relation between state ownership and earnings management: 
H2: SOB are less likely to engage in earnings smoothing than non-SOB. 
3.2. Election years and income smoothing 
Furthermore, it is possible that the actions of SOB are motivated by political concerns. 
In particular, the general elections that determine the head of government are a specific 
event that could motivate politicians in power to use SOB with a political purpose, for 
example to increase their chances of re-election (Dinç, 2005). Thus, an important issue to 
further investigate is whether SOB, or even banks in a more general setting, behave 
differently around elections cycle. 
Previous studies suggest that political interference on SOB activities usually leads to 
its underperformance when compared to their non-state counterparts (Sapienza, 2004; 
Dinç, 2005; Micco et al., 2007). Micco et al. (2007) presents two possible explanations 
for these results: (i) following banks’ social or development role, SOB are less profitable 
because they address market imperfections that would leave social but financially 
unprofitable projects not financed; (ii) following a political view, SOB are inefficient 
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because they are influenced by politicians whose main interest is maximizing their 
personal objectives. 
Rogoff and Sibert (1988) argue that politicians have incentives to take actions to 
induce favourable economic outcomes before elections. When macroeconomic factors 
are controlled for, no statistical relationship between the electoral cycle and the state 
interventions should exist unless the government influences regulatory actions. However, 
if politicians can influence regulators there are good reasons to expect the electoral cycle 
to affect regulatory actions (Brown and Dinç, 2005).  
As previously stated, banks’ income smoothing practices aims to reduce income 
volatility by stabilizing banks’ net profit over time (Curcio and Hasan, 2015). Given that 
reduced volatility is generally assumed as a signal of lower risk, managers have incentives 
to smooth earnings (Anandarajan et al., 2007). 
Although there are some previous studies analysing the impact of political influences 
on banking performance, this is to the best of our knowledge, the first research to study 
the impact of a country’s general elections on income smoothing practices by the banking 
sector. Thus, we argue that in election years, state-owned bank managers may be more 
strongly persuaded to report stable results as a sign to stakeholders of lower risk and 
therefore might have a greater incentive to smooth earnings than non-state-owned bank 
managers. Accordingly, we propose the following hypothesis: 
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4.1. Sample characterization 
Our study focuses on European commercial banks for an eight-year period (2011-
2018), for which we extracted both bank financial statements and banks’ individual 
ownership information from Moody's Analytics BankFocus database. Country-level data 
were collected from Eurostat. The definition of ultimate owner used by BankFocus is a 
path of minimum 50,01% known or unknown shareholders. Therefore, a bank is classified 
as state-owned if government ownership is at least 50,01%. 
Following prior studies such as Brown and Dinç (2005), Dinç (2005) and Micco et al. 
(2007), we use the national elections years of each country to investigate the existence of 
political influences in the banking system. Accordingly, we first determine whether the 
head of government is the president or prime minister from the European Union official 
website. Then, the dates of all the elections that decided the head of government between 
2011 and 2018 are documented using Parties and Elections website and various internet 
sources. 
In order to control for differences in the accounting for LLPs, we focus on European 
countries where banks adopt uniform IFRS procedure in the estimation of LLPs. We then 
use the following criteria to obtain a cleaner sample. First, we use data from banks’ 
consolidated balance sheets and income statements in order to avoid financial information 
duplications. Second, we choose only commercial banks in order to select a sample of 
banks as homogeneous as possible in regards to their activities. Third, we remove all 
countries that do not have any SOB, so that we can assure the comparability between the 
countries in our sample. 
Then, we exclude extreme bank year observations for all variables of interest by 
eliminating outliers at the top and bottom at 99% and 1%, respectively. Lastly, based on 
the sample of SOB, we then identify the sample of non-SOB by maintaining only the 
banks with total loans closest to those of SOB (+/- one standard deviation of loans), in 
order to obtain a more homogeneous sample. 
Therefore, our final dataset consists of annual end-of-year information for 248 
commercial banks originating from 15 European Union countries, of which 35 are state-
owned and 213 are non-state-owned. Our sample comprises a majority of non-listed 
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banks, including 47 listed banks and 201 non-listed banks (representing 81% of the total 
sample banks). The total number of bank-year observations are 719. Table I gives a 
breakdown of the sample by ownership type and country. 
TABLE I - SUMMARY OF SAMPLE DISTRIBUTIONS BY OWNERSHIP TYPE AND COUNTRY. 
Country SOB % non-SOB % Total % 
Austria 2 6% 14 7% 16 6% 
Belgium 2 6% 8 4% 10 4% 
Cyprus 1 3% 6 3% 7 3% 
France 3 9% 27 13% 30 12% 
Germany 1 3% 12 6% 13 5% 
Hungary 1 3% 11 5% 12 5% 
Ireland 4 11% 6 3% 10 4% 
Italy 1 3% 22 10% 23 9% 
Latvia 1 3% 12 6% 13 5% 
Netherlands 4 11% 12 6% 16 6% 
Poland 2 6% 14 7% 16 6% 
Portugal 3 9% 7 3% 10 4% 
Slovenia 2 6% 6 3% 8 3% 
Spain 1 3% 27 13% 28 11% 
United Kingdom 7 20% 29 14% 36 15% 
Total 35 100% 213 100% 248 100% 
 
4.2. Empirical model 
We test the income smoothing hypothesis by applying an empirical baseline panel 
specification based on a modified version of the model used by Ahmed et al. (1999), 
Anandarajan et al. (2007), Leventis et al. (2011), Bouvatier et al. (2014), Curcio and 
Hasan (2015) and Ozili and Arun (2018): 
0 1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
8
it it it it it it it it
it it
LLP LLP EBT CAP NPL LOANS SIZE GDP
LISTED
       
 
−= + + + + + + +
+ +    (1) 
where: 
LLP   ratio of LLPs to total assets for bank i at year t 
LLPt-1  lagged LLP 
EBT   ratio of earnings before taxes and LLPs to total assets 
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CAP  ratio of actual regulatory capital (primary or Tier I capital) before loan loss 
reserves to the minimum required regulatory capital 
NPL   ratio of non-performing loans to total assets 
LOANS  ratio of customer loans to total assets 
SIZE   natural logarithm of total assets  
GDP   annual growth rate of the gross domestic product for each country 
LISTED  dummy variable that takes the value of one for listed commercial banks 
and zero otherwise 
 
Consistent with Bikker and Metzemakers (2005), Bouvatier et al. (2014) and Ozili 
and Arun (2018), we consider the lagged dependent variable (LLPt-1) to control for 
dynamic adjustments to LLPs in anticipation of potential losses on a bank loan portfolio. 
Thus, we would anticipate a positive coefficient if banks managers engage in dynamic 
adjustments to LLPs. Although we include this variable, we estimate the model through 
a linear regression with GLS random effects and not with dynamic panel data, given to 
the small size of our sample. 
Based on the majority of prior literature - Ahmed et al. (1999), Anandarajan et al. 
(2007), Fonseca and González (2008), Leventis et al. (2011), Bouvatier et al. (2014) 
among others - we use the ratio of earnings before taxes and LLPs to total assets to 
examine the use of LLPs for earnings management. If commercial banks in our sample 
use LLPs to smooth earnings, we would expect a positive and significant relation between 
EBT and LLP.  
Following prior research, our model in regression (1) includes several control 
variables to isolate the non-discretionary components of LLP from its discretionary 
components (Curcio and Hasan, 2015; Fonseca and González, 2008; Ozili and Arun, 
2018).  
GDP is a proxy for the change in economic growth that capture the effects of 
macroeconomic conditions on LLPs and aims to control for the pro-cyclical effect of 
LLPs (Anandarajan et al., 2007; Fonseca and Gonzàlez, 2008; Curcio and Hasan, 2015). 
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We expect a negative coefficient on this variable because banks will reduce LLPs in order 
to inflate their earnings in the presence of an economic downturn (Leventis et al., 2011).  
We follow Pérez, Salas-Fumas and Saurina (2008), Anandarajan et al. (2007) and 
Leventis et al. (2011) and include SIZE as a control variable for bank size. Although the 
relation between LLP and bank size is non-monotonic (Leventis et al., 2011), we expect 
that bigger banks might engage in a higher credit portfolio diversification, which will 
result in a negative coefficient for this variable (Leventis et al., 2011).  
LOANS is generally used as an indicator of risk of default for the overall credit 
portfolio that can be thought as a proxy to capture general provisions (Curcio and Hasan, 
2015) and NPL is considered as a specific provision since non-performing loans reflect 
probable loan losses (Beaver and Engel, 1996). LLPs are expected to be positively 
affected by changes in these two variables.  
Similar to Ahmed et al. (1999), Beatty et al. (1995) and Anandarajan et al. (2007), 
we use the ratio of actual regulatory capital before loan loss reserves to the minimum 
required regulatory capital to indicate the use of LLPs for capital management through 
our variable CAP. We expect a negative sign on this coefficient if capital management is 
present because we expect banks to keep higher LLPs when they have low CAP to 
compensate for their low regulatory capital. Lastly, we introduce the dummy variable 
LISTED because listed commercial banks may have different incentives to engage in 
earnings management (Anandarajan et al., 2007). 
Moreover, given the importance of ownership structure in bank’s performance, we 
estimate the following regression in order to capture differences in earnings smoothing 
practices between SOB and non-SOB: 
0 1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
8 9 10 *
it it it it it it it it
it it it it
LLP LLP EBT CAP NPL LOANS SIZE GDP
LISTED SOB SOB EBT
       
   
−= + + + + + + +
+ + + +  (2) 
where SOB is a dummy variable that takes the value of one for SOB and zero otherwise. 
SOB*EBT is an interaction variable between ownership type and EBT that examines 
whether SOB demonstrate more or less propensity to smooth earnings through LLPs 
when compared to their non-state counterparts. Therefore, if SOB engage less in earnings 
smoothing than non-SOB, as we predict, we expect a negative and significant coefficient 
for SOB*EBT. All remaining variable are defined as before. 
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Finally, in order to examine whether the period of elections influences the practice of 
earnings smoothing, we estimate the following regression: 
0 1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7




it it it it it it it it
it it it it
it it
LLP LLP EBT CAP NPL LOANS SIZE GDP
LISTED ELECTION ELECTION EBT SOB
ELECTION EBT SOB
       
   
 
−= + + + + + + +
+ + + +
+ +  (3) 
In regression (3) we include the dummy variable ELECTION that assumes the value 
of 1 if it is an election year in each country of our sample and an interaction variable 
ELECTION*EBT. If commercial banks engage more in earnings smoothing in election 
years, compared to non-election years, then we expect the coefficient of the interaction 
variable to be positive and statistically significant. Furthermore, we include a two-way 
interaction variable ELECTION*EBT*SOB that shows the interaction of SOB relative to 
non-SOB with earnings during the year of elections. If SOB use LLPs to more 
aggressively smooth earnings relative to non-SOB in election periods (as our 
supposition), we expect the coefficient of ELECTION*EBT*SOB to be positive and 
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5. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
5.1. Descriptive statistics 
Table II presents descriptive statistics for the full sample, SOB and non-SOB samples 
for the period of analysis between 2011 and 2018.  
Results show that on average LLPs are 0.6% of total assets for the full and non-SOB 
samples, and are higher for SOB at 0.7%. Thus, these results confirm that LLPs are a 
relatively important accrual for the banking sector. The observation of marginally lower 
LLP for non-SOB suggests that these banks retain less provisions when compared to SOB 
and perhaps are using another tool for credit risk management (Ozili and Arun, 2018).   
Regarding the profitability of our sample banks, the mean ratio of earnings before 
taxes and LLPs to total assets (EBT) for the full sample is 1% and is 0.6% for SOB and 
1.1% for non-SOB. These results imply that non-SOB are considerably more profitable 
than SOB in Europe, which corroborates the findings of previous studies suggesting that 
state ownerships leads to underperformance of SOB (Micco et al., 2007; Cornett et al., 
2010; Banerjee and Velamuri, 2015).   
The mean value for CAP is 3.776 for the full sample, 3.758 for the non-SOB sample 
and 3.855 for the SOB sample, implying that, on average, commercial banks in the sample 
are well capitalized. As to the credit quality of our sample banks, non-performing loans 
are, on average, 3.1% of total assets (NPL) and are lower for non-SOB at 3% and higher 
for SOB at 3.5%, suggesting that non-SOB have relatively better credit quality when 
compared to SOB. This result suggests that non-SOB might have better systems of risk 
management to efficiently mitigate non-performing loans to a greater extent than SOB 
during the period of analysis. 
Loans are, on average, higher than half the total assets for our sample banks, 
confirming its importance for the banking activity by showing mean values of 53.6%, 
54.7% and 53.4% for the full sample, SOB and non-SOB samples, respectively. SIZE is 
16.9 for SOB and 15.8 for non-SOB, confirming that, on average, SOB are larger than 
non-SOB and that their large size may contribute to their importance to the financial 
system and to the process of economic development (La Porta et al., 2002).
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TABLE II - DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR THE SAMPLE OF 248 COMMERCIAL BANKS. 
  Statistics LLP EBT CAP NPL LOANS SIZE GDP 
Full sample Mean 0.006 0.010 3.776 0.031 0.536 15.938 0.030 
  Median 0.003 0.010 3.488 0.019 0.598 15.882 0.025 
  Minimum 0.000 -0.054 1.458 0.000 0.014 10.675 -0.080 
  Maximum 0.059 0.062 9.373 0.222 0.914 21.101 0.344 
  Standard Deviation 0.008 0.013 1.366 0.036 0.224 2.038 0.043 
Non-SOB Mean (i) 0.006 0.011 3.758 0.030 0.534 15.763 0.029 
  Median 0.003 0.010 3.455 0.019 0.591 15.773 0.025 
  Min 0.000 -0.054 1.458 0.000 0.014 10.675 -0.080 
  Max 0.059 0.062 9.373 0.212 0.914 21.101 0.344 
  Standard Deviation 0.008 0.013 1.343 0.035 0.224 1.986 0.041 
SOB Mean (ii) 0.007 0.006 3.855 0.035 0.547 16.919 0.035 
  Median 0.002 0.005 3.625 0.018 0.630 16.941 0.027 
  Minimum 0.000 -0.037 1.553 0.000 0.015 10.984 -0.080 
  Maximum 0.058 0.047 8.875 0.222 0.850 19.937 0.344 
  Standard Deviation 0.010 0.010 1.466 0.040 0.224 2.054 0.054 
                  
Diff of Means (iii) = (i) - (ii) -0.001** 0.006*** -0.097 -0.005* -0.013 -1.157*** -0.006** 
    (0.031) (0.000) (0.406) (0.056) (0.4437) (0.000) (0.032) 
                  
Notes: LLP is the ratio of LLPs to total assets; EBT is the ratio of earnings before taxes and LLPs to total assets; CAP is the ratio of actual regulatory capital 
(primary or Tier I capital) before loan loss reserves to the minimum required regulatory capital; NPL is the ratio of non-performing loans to total assets; 
LOANS is the ratio of customer loans to total assets; SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets; GDP is the annual growth rate of the gross domestic 
product for each country. 
∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ represent statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. P-values are reported in parenthesis. 




In addition, we use a t-student test in order to investigate the behaviour of both types 
of banks: state-owned and non-state-owned. With this test, we are able to compare these 
two sub-samples and to determine if their difference of means are statistically significant. 
If the p-value is below 0.05, the results reject the null hypothesis in which the average of 
a certain bank-level variable for SOB is equal to non-SOB, at the 5% level. 
The results show some differences between the two groups of banks: there is statistical 
significance for the mean differences for LLP, EBT, NPL, SIZE and GDP. More 
specifically, the average value of LLP for both types of banks is quite different, since the 
results point to a negative and statistical significance at the 5% level, confirming that SOB 
set aside a significantly higher amount of LLPs than non-SOB.   
5.2. Pearson’s correlation matrix 
Table III provides Pearson correlation matrix for the full sample. Among the 
independent variables, EBT, NPL and LOANS are positively associated with the 
dependent variable LLP, while CAP, SIZE and GDP are negatively associated with LLP, 
although the correlation for SIZE does not reveal statistical significance. 
TABLE III - PEARSON CORRELATION MATRIX FOR FULL SAMPLE. 
  LLP EBT CAP NPL LOANS SIZE GDP 
LLP 1.000             
EBT 0.144*** 1.000           
  (0.000)             
CAP -0.237*** 0.085** 1.000         
  (0.000) (0.011)           
NPL 0.692*** 0.071** -0.151*** 1.000       
  (0.000) (0.014) (0.000)         
LOANS 0.191*** 0.137*** -0.265*** 0.233*** 1.000     
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)       
SIZE -0.034 -0.070** -0.208*** -0.050* 0.201*** 1.000   
  (0.213) (0.011) (0.000) (0.077) (0.000)     
GDP -0.062** 0.005 0.083** 0.003 0.009 -0.035 1.000 
  (0.025) (0.849) (0.011) (0.921) (0.726) (0.191)   
Notes: LLP is the ratio of LLPs to total assets; EBT is the ratio of earnings before taxes and LLPs to total assets; CAP is the ratio 
of actual regulatory capital (primary or Tier I capital) before loan loss reserves to the minimum required regulatory capital; NPL 
is the ratio of non-performing loans to total assets; LOANS is the ratio of customer loans to total assets; SIZE is the natural 
logarithm of total assets; GDP is the annual growth rate of the gross domestic product for each country. 
∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ represent statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. P-values are reported in parenthesis. 
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More specifically, we find that LLP is positively and significantly correlated with 
EBT (0.144), indicating that when earnings before taxes and LLPs are higher, there is an 
increase of LLPs. As expected, LLP is negatively and significantly correlated with CAP 
(-0.237), implying that lower regulatory capital ratios are followed by increases in bank 
provisions. Similarly, LLP is significant and negatively correlated with GDP (-0.062), 
indicating that bank managers increase LLPs in periods of economic downturn, 
suggesting that bank provisions are associated with economic cycle fluctuations.  
Regarding the remaining correlations shown in Table III for the independent 
variables, the results are consistent with similar studies in the literature. Overall, we 
conclude that the correlations coefficients are not sufficiently high to bias our results. In 
fact, the highest correlation value is 0.692, between LLP and NPL, which suggests that 
our study has no multicollinearity concerns. 
5.3. Regression results 
The empirical analysis has three major objectives: detect income smoothing practices 
in the European banking sector, investigate whether SOB behave differently in the use of 
LLPs as a tool for income smoothing, and lastly examine political influences in earnings 
management during election years. According to the hypotheses described in the previous 
section, table IV presents the regression results. 
In contrast to the majority of existing literature (Anandarajan et al., 2007; Leventis et 
al., 2011; Curcio and Hasan, 2015), we do not find conclusive evidence to support the 
use of LLPs to smooth income. Our results from regression (1) show that the coefficient 
of the ratio of earnings before taxes and LLPs to total assets (EBT) is positive but not 
statistically significant across the three estimations. Thus we don’t find evidence to 
sustain our expectations regarding hypothesis 1.  
Although we are not able to draw conclusive evidence about the use of LLPs to 
smooth income as previously stated in the major banking literature, we believe that the 
differences in our findings may be due to some specificities of our sample. First, our 
sample comprises a very recent period of analysis, between 2011 and 2018, during which 
several measures were taken in order to limit the practice of earnings management, such 
as the implementation of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) in 2014, for example.  
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TABLE IV - REGRESSION RESULTS. 
Variables Expected sign 
  Regression 1   Regression 2   Regression 3 
  Coefficient p-value   Coefficient p-value   Coefficient p-value 
Intercept ?  0.005*** 0.007  0.005** 0.013  0.005*** 0.008 
LLPt-1 +   0.382*** 0.000   0.380*** 0.000   0.382*** 0.000 
EBT +   0.002 0.902   0.015 0.404   0.003 0.878 
CAP -   -0.001*** 0.000   -0.001*** 0.000   -0.001*** 0.000 
NPL +   0.091*** 0.000   0.091*** 0.000   0.091*** 0.000 
LOANS +   0.000 0.617   0.001 0.482   0.000 0.608 
SIZE -   -0.000 0.157   -0.000 0.166   -0.000 0.167 
GDP -   -0.021*** 0.000   -0.021*** 0.000   -0.021*** 0.000 
LISTED ?   0.001 0.167   0.001 0.193   0.001 0.173 
SOB ?   - -   0.001 0.158   -0.000 0.999 
SOB*EBT -   - -   -0.131** 0.019   - - 
ELECTION ?   - -   - -   -0.000 0.703 
ELECTION*EBT +   - -   - -   -0.007 0.854 
ELECTION*EBT*SOB +   - -   - -   0.005 0.960 
                      
Number of observations     719     719     719   
Notes: LLP is the dependent variable and is the ratio of LLPs to total assets; LLPt-1 is the lagged LLP; EBT is the ratio of earnings before taxes and LLPs to total assets; 
CAP is the ratio of actual regulatory capital (primary or Tier I capital) before loan loss reserves to the minimum required regulatory capital; NPL is the ratio of non-
performing loans to total assets; LOANS is the ratio of customer loans to total assets; SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets; GDP is the annual growth rate of 
the gross domestic product for each country; LISTED is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for listed commercial banks and 0 otherwise; SOB is a dummy variable 
that takes the value 1 for state-owned banks and zero otherwise. 
∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ represent statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 




Second, our sample includes 248 banks, of which only 14% (35 banks) are state-
owned, what we consider to be relatively small. This is because we follow the 
classification used by BankFocus database and defined a bank as state-owned if it has a 
minimum percentage of government ownership of 50.01%, what lead us to a significant 
reduction in our sample banks. 
Despite this not being the object of our study, our results provide evidence of the 
presence of capital management since the coefficient of CAP is negative and statistically 
significant at the 1% level, which corroborates the recent findings of authors such as Ozili 
and Outa (2017) and Pinto and Picoto (2018). 
As to the control variables, we find the coefficient of NPL to be positive and 
significant in all estimations for the full sample. This is an expected result, confirming 
the direct relation between LLPs and the deterioration in the sample banks’ credit 
portfolio quality, implying that banks increase LLPs when they expect higher non-
performing loans. LOANS coefficient reports a positive sign but it is not statistically 
significant, so we cannot find significant evidence for a relation with LLP. 
The coefficient for SIZE is negative but it is not statistically significant, therefore not 
allowing us to draw significant inference about the relation with LLP. As expected, GDP 
coefficient is negatively associated with LLP and statistically significant at the 1% level, 
supporting the evidence of banks’ pro-cyclical behaviour with economic fluctuations, 
which has already been pointed out in previous empirical studies, such as Fonseca and 
González (2008) and Ozili and Arun (2018).  
Finally, the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable (LLPt-1) shows a positive sign 
and is statistical significant at the 1% level, confirming that banks adjust LLPs in a 
gradual way to recognize potential losses in their loan portfolio. 
Through regression (2), we test the second hypothesis for differential income 
smoothing behaviour among SOB relative to non-SOB. The interaction term SOB*EBT 
is negative and statistically significant at the 5% level, indicating a significant decline in 
earnings smoothing using LLPs by SOB relative to non-SOB. Thus, our results support 
our hypothesis 2, predicting that SOB use LLPs to smooth income to a less extent than 
non-SOB.  
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This finding confirms that the state implicit guarantee acts as a stronger incentive for 
SOB to improve the quality of their financial reports and therefore mitigating 
opportunistic uses of LLPs to smooth earnings. Our results corroborates and extend the 
findings previously documented regarding non-financial companies by Wang and Yung 
(2011) and Gaio and Pinto (2018) and confirms that government protection reduces 
incentives to smooth income on SOB. 
Finally, we investigate for differences of the propensity to use LLPs to smooth income 
in election years of SOB through interaction variable ELECTION*EBT*SOB. The 
coefficient of this variable presented in regression (3) is not statistically significant. This 
indicates insufficient evidence to support our third hypothesis regarding the influence of 
election years on the use of LLPs by SOB to smooth income. Our results remain 
statistically insignificant even when we test for a more general influence of election years 
in all sample banks through interaction variable ELECTION*EBT. 
Our findings suggest that the income smoothing behaviour of the European banking 
sector is not affected by political pressure of national electoral cycles. More precisely, 
SOB do not change significantly their income smoothing practices in election years, 
providing new evidence about the role of political influences in SOB. Despite some 
existing literature such as Dinç (2005) and Ashraf et al. (2018) finds correlation between 
election years and underperformance of SOB, these studies only find evidence for 
developing countries.  
Thus, we provide new insights regarding political influences in banking in two 
different ways. First, we use a sample of developed economies by focusing on European 
countries. Second, we compare income smoothing practices through LLPs instead of 
analysing lending behaviours or performance differences in election years. Hence, we are 
able not only to present new evidence on the relation between elections and banking 
income smoothing, but also in developed economies.  
We believe that our results confirm that in developed countries with stronger 
regulatory systems is more difficult for politicians to exacerbate such influence on the 
banking system and that the electoral cycle in particular does not affect the quality of 
financial reporting.      
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6. ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS AND ROBUSTNESS TESTS 
In this section, we perform some additional tests in order to check the robustness of 
our main findings. First, we analyse the impact of the global financial crisis by comparing 
the income smoothing behaviours of the countries with financial assistance with the 
countries that were not subject to an economic intervention. Second, we investigate if 
SOB’ reported earnings are likely to be influenced by whether the bank is listed or non-
listed. Finally, we study the impact of the SSM’ implementation in 2014 on income 
smoothing practices.  
6.1. The effects of economic interventions 
We perform further tests with the aim of analysing the impact of the 2008 Global 
Financial Crisis on the quality of financial reporting in the European banking sector. In 
order to do that, we created the dummy variable INTERV that takes the value of 1 for the 
European countries that were subject to an economic intervention in the course of the 
2008 financial crisis and for which the sovereign debt crisis was more severe - Portugal, 
Ireland, Spain and Italy - and zero otherwise. 
 Then, we investigate the propensity of these countries to engage in earnings 
smoothing by interacting the dummy variable INTERV and the independent variable EBT 
in Test (1), which allow us to better understand the effects of the sovereign debt crisis on 
these two groups of countries that faced the financial crisis differentially.  
Recent research suggests that increases on monitoring leads to an increase in the 
demand for higher quality in financial reporting. Azzali et al. (2014) finds that the 
financial crisis decreases the opportunistic behaviour through LLPs for riskier banks. 
Pinto and Picoto (2018) show that the countries for which the financial crisis was more 
severe report a decrease in the level of earnings management between 2007 and 2014. 
Filip and Raffournier (2014) investigate the link between the financial crisis and earnings 
management and find evidence for a decrease in income smoothing in the crisis period 
(2008-2009). 
 Given that the European countries with financial assistance were subject to a higher 
degree of monitoring from different stakeholders (Filip and Raffournier, 2014), we expect 
a lower propensity of these countries to engage in earnings management, compared to 
other European countries. The results presented in Table V confirm our expectations and 
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show that the coefficient for the interaction variable INTERV*EBT is negative and 
statistically significant at the 5% level, entailing that the severely affected countries of 
the 2008 financial crisis use LLPs to smooth income to a less extent when compared to 
other European countries in our sample. 
TABLE V - THE EFFECTS OF ECONOMIC INTERVENTIONS. 
Variables 
Test (1)   Test (2) 
Coefficient p-value   Coefficient p-value 
Intercept 0.005*** 0.008  0.005** 0.014 
LLPt-1 0.378*** 0.000   0.377*** 0.000 
EBT 0.023 0.282   0.003 0.874 
CAP -0.001*** 0.000   -0.001*** 0.000 
NPL 0.091*** 0.000   0.094*** 0.000 
LOANS 0.000 0.672   0.000 0.666 
SIZE -0.000 0.189   -0.000 0.266 
GDP -0.022*** 0.000   -0.021*** 0.000 
LISTED 0.001* 0.068   0.001* 0.072 
INTERV -0.000 0.852   -0.001** 0.044 
INTERV*EBT -0.072** 0.047   - - 
SOB - -   0.000 0.866 
INTERV*SOB*EBT - -   -0.130 0.117 
            
Number of observations 719     719   
Notes: All variables remain as previous defined in Tables II, III and IV.  
∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ represent statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
We also investigate if there are differences between SOB and non-SOB of the 
countries subject to intervention in Test (2). In order to do that, we put three variable in 
interaction: INTERV, SOB and EBT. However, we are not able to draw significant 
inference from the INTERV*SOB*EBT coefficient since the results show that this 
coefficient is not statistically significant. 
6.2. Listed vs non-listed banks 
In order to better understand the relation between state ownership and income 
smoothing, we investigate whether there are significant differences between listed and 
non-listed banks that could influence the use of LLPs to smooth bank income.  
The existing literature provides conflicting results about the influence of capital 
markets on the quality of financial reports. Beatty, Ke and Petroni (2002) argue that listed 
bank managers are subject to more pressure to report constantly increasing earnings and 
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find that listed banks have a greater propensity than non-listed banks to use discretion in 
LLPs. Anandarajan et al. (2007) provide evidence that listed Australian banks engage in 
earnings management to a greater extent when compared to their non-listed counterparts. 
On the contrary, Burgstahler et al. (2006) studies European listed and non-listed firms 
and document that non-listed firms display higher levels of earnings management, 
indicating that capital markets provide incentives to improve earnings quality. 
In order to test for this difference, we interact the dummy variable LISTED with the 
independent variable EBT. If listed commercial banks engage more in earnings 
smoothing than non-listed banks, we would expect a positive and significant coefficient 
of this interaction variable. However, our results shown in Table VI  are not statistically 
significant, suggesting that capital markets do not influence the quality of banks’ reported 
financial statements.  
TABLE VI - LISTED VS NON-LISTED BANKS. 
Variables 
Listed vs non-listed   Listed banks   Non-listed banks 
Coefficient p-value   Coefficient p-value   Coefficient p-value 
Intercept 0.005*** 0.007  0.005 0.227  0.004* 0.063 
LLPt-1 0.381*** 0.000   0.329*** 0.000   0.402*** 0.000 
EBT -0.002 0.924   0.041 0.248   0.011 0.604 
CAP -0.001*** 0.000   -0.001** 0.018   -0.001*** 0.001 
NPL 0.091*** 0.000   0.098*** 0.000   0.087*** 0.000 
LOANS 0.000 0.602   0.002 0.248   0.000 0.866 
SIZE -0.000 0.155   -0.000 0.381   -0.000 0.380 
GDP -0.021*** 0.000   -0.037*** 0.002   -0.017*** 0.000 
LISTED 0.000 0.578   - -   - - 
LISTED*EBT 0.015 0.693   - -   - - 
SOB       0.005** 0.020   0.000 0.481 
SOB*EBT       -0.621** 0.011   -0.098* 0.090 
                  
Number of observations 719     232     487   
Number of banks 248     47     201   
Notes: All variables remain as previous defined in Tables II, III and IV.  
∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ represent statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.       
We believe that this lack of evidence regarding the relation between listed banks and 
earnings smoothing may be related to our sample characteristics, including only European 
Union commercial banks. All listed companies in the European Union are required to 
comply with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) since 2005, which may 
improve the reliability of financial reporting (Barth, Landsman and Lang, 2008). Leventis 
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et al. (2011) find a decline in earnings management practices through LLPs after the 
implementation of IFRS in European Union. Moreover, supervisors are more likely to 
apply greater scrutiny to the bigger banks, given their importance in the event of a banking 
crisis. This focus might reduce the incentives to manage earnings in publicly traded banks 
(Fonseca and González, 2008).  
Importantly though, our main results remain unchanged when we compare the two 
sub-samples of listed and non-listed commercial banks. Our previous results stating that 
SOB display lower levels of discretionary behaviour through LLPs remain statistically 
significant, independent of whether they are listed or non-listed. 
6.3. The effects of the Single Supervisory Mechanism 
Finally, we study the impact of the SSM’ implementation on income smoothing 
practices in our sample banks. Effective 2014, the ECB takes the role of ultimate authority 
and prudential supervisor of all banks in the Euro Area (Ferran and Babis, 2013). Prior 
literature suggests that an increase in monitoring can lead to a decrease in earnings 
management practices (Azzali et al., 2014; Filip and Raffournier, 2014). 
With the aim of testing the impact of the SSM’s implementation on earnings 
smoothing behaviour, we create the dummy variable DSSM that takes the value of 1 for 
the years between 2014 and 2018 (right after this program came into operation) and 0 
otherwise and then interact this with EBT. If our sample banks demonstrate lower 
propensity to engage in earnings smoothing after the adoption of the SSM in Europe, 
when compared to the period before of its implementation, we would expect a negative 
and significant coefficient for the interaction variable DSSM*EBT.  
According to our findings presented in Table VII, there is no sufficient evidence to 
establish a relation between the implementation of the SSM and earnings smoothing. Our 
results remain insignificant even when we exclude from the sample the countries that, not 
belonging to the Euro Area, haven’t yet chosen to participate in SSM, which are Hungary, 
Poland and United Kingdom. 
To some extent, we believe that these results may be influenced by the period of our 
analysis, from 2011 to 2018, and wonder if they would be different if we extended the 
period to several years before the beginning of operation of the SSM in 2014. 
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TABLE VII - THE EFFECTS OF THE SINGLE SUPERVISORY MECHANISM. 
Variables 
Full sample   
Sample without Hungary, 
Poland and United Kingdom 
Coefficient p-value   Coefficient p-value 
Intercept 0.008*** 0.000   0.007*** 0.001 
LLPt-1 0.369*** 0.000   0.282*** 0.000 
EBT -0.038 0.297   -0.027 0.537 
CAP -0.001*** 0.000   -0.001*** 0.000 
NPL 0.092*** 0.000   0.098*** 0.000 
LOANS 0.001 0.512   -0.000 0.935 
SIZE -0.000* 0.055   -0.000 0.220 
GDP -0.013*** 0.004   -0.313*** 0.000 
LISTED 0.001 0.181   0.000 0.759 
DSSM -0.003*** 0.000   -0.002*** 0.000 
DSSM*EBT 0.059 0.140   0.053 0.283 
            
Number of observations 719     559   
Notes: All variables remain as previous defined in Tables II, III and IV.  
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The study of earnings management in the banking industry has been the focus of 
numerous previous research largely because the central role that banks play for financial 
stability (Bushman, 2014; Ozili and Outa, 2017). Ownership structure has been 
demonstrated to be a determining factor of firm performance (Cornett et al., 2010). In this 
context, previous studies such as Barth et al. (2001) and La Porta et al. (2002) find that 
state ownership of banks has major impact in financial development. 
This study extends the literature as we examine the effect of state ownership on 
income smoothing practices in the banking industry using a sample of European 
commercial banks in the 2011-2018 period. We also provide new insights concerning 
political influences in banking by investigating the relation between national election 
years and banks’ income smoothing behaviour in developed economies. 
In contrast to the large majority of existing literature, our results do not provide clear 
evidence for the existence of earnings smoothing using LLPs in European banks. 
Nevertheless, when we examine the influence of ownership structure, our results suggest 
that SOB engage in earnings smoothing in a lower degree than their non-state 
counterparts, suggesting that government protection is an important factor in mitigating 
the pressure on bank managers to engage in earnings smoothing. Moreover, we do not 
find a strong relation between national election years and income smoothing, implying 
that the discretionary use of LLPs is not affected by political influence in the electoral 
cycle. 
Additional tests entail that the influence of state ownership previously documented is 
independent of whether a bank is listed or non-listed, implying that capital markets do not 
play an important role in explaining the relation between state ownership and income 
smoothing. In the period of analysis, we also document that commercial banks located in 
the severely affected countries of the 2008 financial crisis use LLPs to smooth income to 
a less extent than other European countries in our sample, suggesting that increases on 
monitoring lead to an increase in the quality of financial reporting. 
Overall, our study demonstrates that government protection and increasing 
monitoring limit the use of LLPs as a tool for income smoothing purposes, contributing 
to higher quality in financial reporting of the banking sector. On the other side, capital 
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markets and political influences in election years do not seem to influence earnings 
smoothing. Our results confirm that in developed countries with stronger regulatory 
systems is more difficult for politicians to exacerbate political influence on the banking 
system and that the electoral cycle in particular does not affect the quality of reported 
earnings. 
We believe this study makes important contributions to the existing literature. 
Considering the increasing importance of corporate governance, we use an up-to-date 
sample with both state-owned and non-SOB, which allows us to contribute to a yet 
underdeveloped topic on banking literature and therefore to a better understanding of the 
role of state ownership on income smoothing. In addition, our conclusions may also be 
interesting from a regulatory point of view, as a way to improve banking authorities’ 
perception of earnings smoothing practices, because lower accounting discretion power 
can contribute to the production of more reliable financial reporting. This may help 
regulators and supervisors to improve legislation in the banking sector and to better 
allocate public resources. 
Our study has three major limitations. First, our data does not include years before the 
global financial crisis of 2008, reflecting only the effects of posterior years. Second, we 
have not used dynamic panel data in our estimations. Third, we identified a bank as state-
owned if state ownership is more than 50% what lead to a decrease in our sample banks, 
while prior studies use a metric of only 20% such as La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and 
Shleifer (1999) and Dinç (2005). 
Regarding future research, it would be interesting to investigate the relationship 
between state ownership and earnings smoothing practices in other areas of the world. 
Since the degree of state ownership varies across countries (La Porta et al., 2002), the 
geographic location can play a significant role in earnings smoothing practices and the 
results can be quite different from those presented in Europe. For example, it would be 
interesting to compare the results obtained in Europe with Eastern Europe countries such 
as Russia where the state plays a more significant role in the economy.     
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Appendix 1 – Summary of sample distribution by country (listed and non-listed banks). 
Country Listed % Non-listed % Total % 
Austria 5 11% 11 5% 16 6% 
Belgium 0 0% 10 5% 10 4% 
Cyprus 1 2% 6 3% 7 3% 
France 2 4% 28 14% 30 12% 
Germany 0 0% 13 6% 13 5% 
Hungary 1 2% 11 5% 12 5% 
Ireland 3 6% 7 3% 10 4% 
Italy 15 32% 8 4% 23 9% 
Latvia 0 0% 13 6% 13 5% 
Netherlands 2 4% 14 7% 16 6% 
Poland 10 21% 6 3% 16 6% 
Portugal 1 2% 9 4% 10 4% 
Slovenia 1 2% 7 3% 8 3% 
Spain 4 9% 24 12% 28 11% 
United Kingdom 2 4% 34 17% 36 15% 
Total 47 100% 201 100% 248 100% 
 
 
